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Single Idea 16175
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
]
Full Idea
A cause ought to increase the frequency of the effect, but this fact may not show up in the probabilities if other causes are at work.
Gist of Idea
A cause won't increase the effect frequency if other causes keep interfering
Source
Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 1.1)
Book Ref
Cartwright,Nancy: 'How the Laws of Physics Lie' [OUP 2002], p.23
A Reaction
[She cites Patrick Suppes for this one] Presumably in experimental situations you can weed out the interference, but that threatens to eliminate mere 'probability' entirely.
The
18 ideas
from Nancy Cartwright
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17503
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Theories can never represent accurately, because their components are abstract
[Cartwright,N, by Portides]
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6781
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There are fundamental explanatory laws (false!), and phenomenological laws (regularities)
[Cartwright,N, by Bird]
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16166
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Laws of appearances are 'phenomenological'; laws of reality are 'theoretical'
[Cartwright,N]
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16170
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To get from facts to equations, we need a prepared descriptions suited to mathematics
[Cartwright,N]
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16171
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The covering law view assumes that each phenomenon has a 'right' explanation
[Cartwright,N]
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16167
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Laws get the facts wrong, and explanation rests on improvements and qualifications of laws
[Cartwright,N]
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16169
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Laws apply to separate domains, but real explanations apply to intersecting domains
[Cartwright,N]
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16175
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A cause won't increase the effect frequency if other causes keep interfering
[Cartwright,N]
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16176
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Covering-law explanation lets us explain storms by falling barometers
[Cartwright,N]
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16177
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I disagree with the covering-law view that there is a law to cover every single case
[Cartwright,N]
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16178
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There are few laws for when one theory meets another
[Cartwright,N]
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16179
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Good organisation may not be true, and the truth may not organise very much
[Cartwright,N]
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16180
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You can't explain one quail's behaviour by just saying that all quails do it
[Cartwright,N]
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16181
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Simple laws have quite different outcomes when they act in combinations
[Cartwright,N]
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16182
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Two main types of explanation are by causes, or by citing a theoretical framework
[Cartwright,N]
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16183
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In science, best explanations have regularly turned out to be false
[Cartwright,N]
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16184
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An explanation is a model that fits a theory and predicts the phenomenological laws
[Cartwright,N]
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16185
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Causality indicates which properties are real
[Cartwright,N]
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