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Single Idea 1619
[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
]
Full Idea
This essay offered a verificationist account of language without the logical positivist error of supposing that verification could be reduced to a mere sequence of sense-experiences.
Clarification
Verificationism in language says meaning is entirely a matter of connections with actual experience
Gist of Idea
There is an attempt to give a verificationist account of meaning, without the error of reducing everything to sensations
Source
comment on Willard Quine (On What There Is [1948]) by Daniel C. Dennett - works
Book Ref
Quine,Willard: 'From a Logical Point of View' [Harper and Row 1963], p.1
A Reaction
This is because of Quine's holistic view of theory, so that sentences are not tested individually, where sense-data might be needed as support, but as whole teams which need to be simple, coherent etc.
The
29 ideas
from 'On What There Is'
10241
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For Quine, there is only one way to exist
[Quine, by Shapiro]
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4064
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The idea of a thing and the idea of existence are two sides of the same coin
[Quine, by Crane]
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19277
|
Quine rests existence on bound variables, because he thinks singular terms can be analysed away
[Quine, by Hale]
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12210
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Quine's ontology is wrong; his question is scientific, and his answer is partly philosophical
[Fine,K on Quine]
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8459
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Fictional quantification has no ontology, so we study ontology through scientific theories
[Quine, by Orenstein]
|
16261
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If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication
[Maudlin on Quine]
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4443
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Quine has argued that predicates do not have any ontological commitment
[Quine, by Armstrong]
|
1619
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There is an attempt to give a verificationist account of meaning, without the error of reducing everything to sensations
[Dennett on Quine]
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19159
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Quine relates predicates to their objects, by being 'true of' them
[Quine, by Davidson]
|
8455
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Canonical notation needs quantification, variables and predicates, but not names
[Quine, by Orenstein]
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8456
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Quine extended Russell's defining away of definite descriptions, to also define away names
[Quine, by Orenstein]
|
8856
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Quine's indispensability argument said arguments for abstracta were a posteriori
[Quine, by Yablo]
|
7698
|
If to be is to be the value of a variable, we must already know the values available
[Jacquette on Quine]
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15402
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There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible
[Quine]
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1609
|
I do not believe there is some abstract entity called a 'meaning' which we can 'have'
[Quine]
|
1617
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The word 'meaning' is only useful when talking about significance or about synonymy
[Quine]
|
1611
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Names can be converted to descriptions, and Russell showed how to eliminate those
[Quine]
|
1610
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To be is to be the value of a variable, which amounts to being in the range of reference of a pronoun
[Quine]
|
1612
|
Realism, conceptualism and nominalism in medieval universals reappear in maths as logicism, intuitionism and formalism
[Quine]
|
1613
|
Logicists cheerfully accept reference to bound variables and all sorts of abstract entities
[Quine]
|
1615
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Intuitionism says classes are invented, and abstract entities are constructed from specified ingredients
[Quine]
|
1614
|
Conceptualism holds that there are universals but they are mind-made
[Quine]
|
1616
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Formalism says maths is built of meaningless notations; these build into rules which have meaning
[Quine]
|
1618
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We study bound variables not to know reality, but to know what reality language asserts
[Quine]
|
8496
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What actually exists does not, of course, depend on language
[Quine]
|
8497
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An ontology is like a scientific theory; we accept the simplest scheme that fits disorderly experiences
[Quine]
|
8498
|
Treating scattered sensations as single objects simplifies our understanding of experience
[Quine]
|
18209
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We can never translate our whole language of objects into phenomenalism
[Quine]
|
12443
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Can an unactualized possible have self-identity, and be distinct from other possibles?
[Quine]
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