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Full Idea
Endurance theory might claim a banana stands (atemporally) in different relations to different times (being-green-at to Monday), ..or has different instantiation relations to different properties (instantiates-on-Monday to being green).
Gist of Idea
Endurance theory can relate properties to times, or timed instantiations to properties
Source
Katherine Hawley (How Things Persist [2001], 1.3)
Book Ref
Hawley,Katherine: 'How Things Persist' [OUP 2004], p.15
A Reaction
She suggests that the first approach is more plausible for endurantists. I think she is right (assuming these are the only two options). Monday awaits a banana, but yellow doesn't.
| 15275 | 'Dense' time raises doubts about continuous objects, so they need 'continuous' time [Harré/Madden] |
| 9664 | Endurance is the wrong account, because things change intrinsic properties like shape [Lewis] |
| 9665 | There are three responses to the problem that intrinsic shapes do not endure [Lewis] |
| 12295 | 3-D says things are stretched in space but not in time, and entire at a time but not at a location [Fine,K] |
| 12298 | Genuine motion, rather than variation of position, requires the 'entire presence' of the object [Fine,K] |
| 8271 | An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times [Lowe] |
| 14727 | Three-dimensionalists assert 'enduring', being wholly present at each moment, and deny 'temporal parts' [Sider] |
| 14738 | Some might say that its inconsistency with time travel is a reason to favour three-dimensionalism [Sider] |
| 16192 | Endurance theory can relate properties to times, or timed instantiations to properties [Hawley] |
| 16196 | Endurance is a sophisticated theory, covering properties, instantiation and time [Hawley] |
| 13924 | The persistence of objects seems to be needed if the past is to explain the present [Haslanger] |
| 13930 | Persistence makes change and its products intelligible [Haslanger] |