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Single Idea 1621
[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
]
Full Idea
Once theory of meaning and of reference are separated it is a short step to recognising as the primary business of theory of meaning simply the synonymy of linguistic forms and analyticity of statements; meanings themselves may be abandoned.
Gist of Idea
Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important
Source
Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953], p.22)
Book Ref
Quine,Willard: 'From a Logical Point of View' [Harper and Row 1963], p.22
A Reaction
I can't buy the abandonment of meaning, because when I introspect my own speech there is clearly what I want to say formulating in my mind before the words are settled.
The
29 ideas
from 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'
9204
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Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions
[Fine,K on Quine]
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17738
|
Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics
[Jenkins on Quine]
|
19492
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Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology
[Yablo on Quine]
|
12188
|
Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity
[Quine, by McFetridge]
|
15090
|
Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths
[Quine, by Shoemaker]
|
9383
|
Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori
[Boghossian on Quine]
|
12424
|
Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori
[Quine, by Kitcher]
|
9338
|
Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science
[Horwich on Quine]
|
9337
|
Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori
[Quine, by Horwich]
|
9340
|
Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right
[Horwich on Quine]
|
19488
|
The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations
[Quine, by Yablo]
|
7317
|
'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous
[Quine, by Miller,A]
|
9366
|
Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori
[Quine, by Boghossian]
|
14473
|
Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution
[Quine, by Thomasson]
|
7321
|
The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best
[Miller,A on Quine]
|
8803
|
Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language
[Davidson on Quine]
|
17737
|
The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation
[Quine, by Jenkins]
|
9371
|
Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy
[Quine]
|
10929
|
Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning
[Quine]
|
1620
|
Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts
[Quine]
|
1621
|
Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important
[Quine]
|
1622
|
Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'?
[Quine]
|
1623
|
Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it
[Quine]
|
1624
|
If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity
[Quine]
|
1625
|
Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body
[Quine]
|
1626
|
It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component
[Quine]
|
1627
|
Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system
[Quine]
|
1628
|
If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience
[Quine]
|
1629
|
Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple
[Quine]
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