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Single Idea 16219

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality ]

Full Idea

Non-linguistic objects, properties, and states of affairs cannot be indeterminate because they cannot have determinate truth-values either. No cloud is indeterminate, just as no cloud is either determinately true or determinately false.

Gist of Idea

Non-linguistic things cannot be indeterminate, because they don't have truth-values at all

Source

Katherine Hawley (How Things Persist [2001], 4.1)

Book Ref

Hawley,Katherine: 'How Things Persist' [OUP 2004], p.102


A Reaction

If vagueness must be linguistic, this means animals can never experience it, which I doubt. Presumably 'this is a cloud' is only made vague by the vagueness of the object, rather than by the vagueness of the sentence?


The 15 ideas with the same theme [treating some aspects of reality as inherently vague]:

In actual things nothing is indefinite [Leibniz]
To say reality itself is vague is not properly intelligible [Dummett]
Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter [Jackson]
Nothing is true, but everything is exact [Baudrillard]
Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe]
Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans]
There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis]
Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis]
If 'red' is vague, then membership of the set of red things is vague, so there is no set of red things [Sainsbury]
Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature [Keefe/Smith]
There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson]
Equally fuzzy objects can be identical, so fuzziness doesn't entail vagueness [Williamson]
Non-linguistic things cannot be indeterminate, because they don't have truth-values at all [Hawley]
Maybe for the world to be vague, it must be vague in its foundations? [Hawley]
A crumbling statue can't become vague, because vagueness is incoherent [Merricks]