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Single Idea 16220
[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
]
Full Idea
There are three main views of vagueness: the Epistemic view says we talk precisely, but don't know what we talk precisely about; the Semantic view is that it is loose talk, or semantic indecision; the Ontic view says it is part of how the world is.
Gist of Idea
Vagueness is either in our knowledge, in our talk, or in reality
Source
Katherine Hawley (How Things Persist [2001], 4.1)
Book Ref
Hawley,Katherine: 'How Things Persist' [OUP 2004], p.101
A Reaction
[My summary of two paragraphs] She associates Williamson with the first view, Lewis with the second, and Van Inwagen with the third.
The
39 ideas
from Katherine Hawley
16191
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Perdurance needs an atemporal perspective, to say that the object 'has' different temporal parts
[Hawley]
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16192
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Endurance theory can relate properties to times, or timed instantiations to properties
[Hawley]
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16193
|
'Adverbialism' explains change by saying an object has-at-some-time a given property
[Hawley]
|
16195
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Presentism solves the change problem: the green banana ceases, so can't 'relate' to the yellow one
[Hawley]
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16196
|
Endurance is a sophisticated theory, covering properties, instantiation and time
[Hawley]
|
16197
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How does perdurance theory explain our concern for our own future selves?
[Hawley]
|
16199
|
If an object is the sum of all of its temporal parts, its mass is staggeringly large!
[Hawley]
|
16200
|
Are sortals spatially maximal - so no cat part is allowed to be a cat?
[Hawley]
|
16201
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Perdurance says things are sums of stages; Stage Theory says each stage is the thing
[Hawley]
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16202
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The problem of change arises if there must be 'identity' of a thing over time
[Hawley]
|
16203
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Stage Theory seems to miss out the link between stages of the same object
[Hawley]
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16204
|
Stage Theory says every stage is a distinct object, which gives too many objects
[Hawley]
|
16205
|
The stages of Stage Theory seem too thin to populate the world, or to be referred to
[Hawley]
|
16206
|
Stages must be as fine-grained in length as change itself, so any change is a new stage
[Hawley]
|
16207
|
Time could be discrete (like integers) or dense (rationals) or continuous (reals)
[Hawley]
|
16208
|
Supervaluation refers to one vaguely specified thing, through satisfaction by everything in some range
[Hawley]
|
16211
|
A homogeneous rotating disc should be undetectable according to Humean supervenience
[Hawley]
|
16212
|
An isolated stage can't be a banana (which involves suitable relations to other stages)
[Hawley]
|
16213
|
Stages of one thing are related by extrinsic counterfactual and causal relations
[Hawley]
|
16215
|
Causation is nothing more than the counterfactuals it grounds?
[Hawley]
|
16216
|
Part of the sense of a proper name is a criterion of the thing's identity
[Hawley]
|
16218
|
On any theory of self, it is hard to explain why we should care about our future selves
[Hawley]
|
16220
|
Vagueness is either in our knowledge, in our talk, or in reality
[Hawley]
|
16219
|
Non-linguistic things cannot be indeterminate, because they don't have truth-values at all
[Hawley]
|
16221
|
Supervaluationism takes what the truth-value would have been if indecision was resolved
[Hawley]
|
16226
|
Epistemic vagueness seems right in the case of persons
[Hawley]
|
16222
|
Indeterminacy in objects and in properties are not distinct cases
[Hawley]
|
16223
|
Maybe for the world to be vague, it must be vague in its foundations?
[Hawley]
|
16225
|
If two things might be identical, there can't be something true of one and false of the other
[Hawley]
|
16227
|
Philosophers are good at denying the obvious
[Hawley]
|
16228
|
The constitution theory is endurantism plus more than one object in a place
[Hawley]
|
16229
|
Constitution theory needs sortal properties like 'being a sweater' to distinguish it from its thread
[Hawley]
|
16230
|
Maybe the only properties are basic ones like charge, mass and spin
[Hawley]
|
16232
|
An object is 'natural' if its stages are linked by certain non-supervenient relations
[Hawley]
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14492
|
If the constitution view says thread and sweater are two things, why do we talk of one thing?
[Hawley]
|
16237
|
The modal features of statue and lump are disputed; when does it stop being that statue?
[Hawley]
|
16240
|
If a life is essentially the sum of its temporal parts, it couldn't be shorter or longer than it was?
[Hawley]
|
16239
|
To decide whether something is a counterpart, we need to specify a relevant sortal concept
[Hawley]
|
16238
|
Perdurantists can adopt counterpart theory, to explain modal differences of identical part-sums
[Hawley]
|