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Single Idea 16225

[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law ]

Full Idea

We can call the 'transference principle' the claim that if it is indeterminate whether two objects are identical, then nothing determinately true of one can be determinately false of the other.

Gist of Idea

If two things might be identical, there can't be something true of one and false of the other

Source

Katherine Hawley (How Things Persist [2001], 4.9)

Book Ref

Hawley,Katherine: 'How Things Persist' [OUP 2004], p.124


A Reaction

The point is that Leibniz's Law could immediately be invoked to show there is no possibility of their identity.

Related Idea

Idea 16224 There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b [Evans, by PG]


The 18 ideas with the same theme [identical objects must have identical features or truths]:

Only if two things are identical do they have the same attributes [Aristotle]
Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other [Duns Scotus]
Two bodies differ when (at some time) you can say something of one you can't say of the other [Hobbes]
Two substances can't be the same if they have different attributes [Spinoza]
Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman]
The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke]
Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law? [Wiggins]
Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law [Wiggins]
Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard]
Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard]
Leibniz's Law must be kept separate from the substitutivity principle [Noonan]
Indiscernibility is basic to our understanding of identity and distinctness [Noonan]
Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity [McGinn]
Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py' [McGinn]
Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity [McGinn]
Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth [Oderberg]
If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity [Sider]
If two things might be identical, there can't be something true of one and false of the other [Hawley]