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Single Idea 16229
[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
]
Full Idea
Constitution theorists need to posit sortal properties of 'being a thread' or 'being a sweater', as grounds for the differences betwween the sweater and the thread that constitutes it.
Gist of Idea
Constitution theory needs sortal properties like 'being a sweater' to distinguish it from its thread
Source
Katherine Hawley (How Things Persist [2001], 5.1)
Book Ref
Hawley,Katherine: 'How Things Persist' [OUP 2004], p.146
A Reaction
This is further grounds for thinking the constitution view ridiculous, because there are no such properties. 'Being a sweater' is a category, which something belongs in if it has all the properties of a sweater. The final property triggers sweaterhood.
Related Idea
Idea 16228
The constitution theory is endurantism plus more than one object in a place [Hawley]
The
39 ideas
from Katherine Hawley
16191
|
Perdurance needs an atemporal perspective, to say that the object 'has' different temporal parts
[Hawley]
|
16192
|
Endurance theory can relate properties to times, or timed instantiations to properties
[Hawley]
|
16193
|
'Adverbialism' explains change by saying an object has-at-some-time a given property
[Hawley]
|
16195
|
Presentism solves the change problem: the green banana ceases, so can't 'relate' to the yellow one
[Hawley]
|
16196
|
Endurance is a sophisticated theory, covering properties, instantiation and time
[Hawley]
|
16197
|
How does perdurance theory explain our concern for our own future selves?
[Hawley]
|
16199
|
If an object is the sum of all of its temporal parts, its mass is staggeringly large!
[Hawley]
|
16200
|
Are sortals spatially maximal - so no cat part is allowed to be a cat?
[Hawley]
|
16201
|
Perdurance says things are sums of stages; Stage Theory says each stage is the thing
[Hawley]
|
16202
|
The problem of change arises if there must be 'identity' of a thing over time
[Hawley]
|
16203
|
Stage Theory seems to miss out the link between stages of the same object
[Hawley]
|
16204
|
Stage Theory says every stage is a distinct object, which gives too many objects
[Hawley]
|
16205
|
The stages of Stage Theory seem too thin to populate the world, or to be referred to
[Hawley]
|
16206
|
Stages must be as fine-grained in length as change itself, so any change is a new stage
[Hawley]
|
16207
|
Time could be discrete (like integers) or dense (rationals) or continuous (reals)
[Hawley]
|
16208
|
Supervaluation refers to one vaguely specified thing, through satisfaction by everything in some range
[Hawley]
|
16211
|
A homogeneous rotating disc should be undetectable according to Humean supervenience
[Hawley]
|
16212
|
An isolated stage can't be a banana (which involves suitable relations to other stages)
[Hawley]
|
16213
|
Stages of one thing are related by extrinsic counterfactual and causal relations
[Hawley]
|
16215
|
Causation is nothing more than the counterfactuals it grounds?
[Hawley]
|
16216
|
Part of the sense of a proper name is a criterion of the thing's identity
[Hawley]
|
16218
|
On any theory of self, it is hard to explain why we should care about our future selves
[Hawley]
|
16220
|
Vagueness is either in our knowledge, in our talk, or in reality
[Hawley]
|
16219
|
Non-linguistic things cannot be indeterminate, because they don't have truth-values at all
[Hawley]
|
16221
|
Supervaluationism takes what the truth-value would have been if indecision was resolved
[Hawley]
|
16226
|
Epistemic vagueness seems right in the case of persons
[Hawley]
|
16222
|
Indeterminacy in objects and in properties are not distinct cases
[Hawley]
|
16223
|
Maybe for the world to be vague, it must be vague in its foundations?
[Hawley]
|
16225
|
If two things might be identical, there can't be something true of one and false of the other
[Hawley]
|
16227
|
Philosophers are good at denying the obvious
[Hawley]
|
16228
|
The constitution theory is endurantism plus more than one object in a place
[Hawley]
|
16229
|
Constitution theory needs sortal properties like 'being a sweater' to distinguish it from its thread
[Hawley]
|
16230
|
Maybe the only properties are basic ones like charge, mass and spin
[Hawley]
|
16232
|
An object is 'natural' if its stages are linked by certain non-supervenient relations
[Hawley]
|
14492
|
If the constitution view says thread and sweater are two things, why do we talk of one thing?
[Hawley]
|
16237
|
The modal features of statue and lump are disputed; when does it stop being that statue?
[Hawley]
|
16240
|
If a life is essentially the sum of its temporal parts, it couldn't be shorter or longer than it was?
[Hawley]
|
16239
|
To decide whether something is a counterpart, we need to specify a relevant sortal concept
[Hawley]
|
16238
|
Perdurantists can adopt counterpart theory, to explain modal differences of identical part-sums
[Hawley]
|