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Single Idea 16232
[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
]
Full Idea
I suggest that our distinction between natural and unnatural (gerrymandered) objects corresponds to a distinction between series of stages which are and are not linked by certain non-supervenient relations.
Gist of Idea
An object is 'natural' if its stages are linked by certain non-supervenient relations
Source
Katherine Hawley (How Things Persist [2001], 5.5)
Book Ref
Hawley,Katherine: 'How Things Persist' [OUP 2004], p.156
A Reaction
See Idea 16213 for the nature of these 'relations'. I don't understand how an abstraction (as I take it) like a relation can unify a physical object. A trout-turkey is unified by a relation of some sort. Hawley defends Stage Theory.
Related Idea
Idea 16213
Stages of one thing are related by extrinsic counterfactual and causal relations [Hawley]
The
37 ideas
with the same theme
[what distinctively unifies physical objects]:
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16154
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Aristotle gave up his earlier notion of individuals, because it relied on universals
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
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16158
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Form and matter may not make up a concrete particular, because there are also accidents like weight
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
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12499
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Bodies distinctively have cohesion of parts, and power to communicate motion
[Locke]
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5533
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Objects in themselves are not known to us at all
[Kant]
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21449
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The a priori concept of objects in general is the ground of experience
[Kant]
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14732
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A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre
[Russell]
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6473
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Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws
[Russell]
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23466
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Objects are the substance of the world
[Wittgenstein]
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8498
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Treating scattered sensations as single objects simplifies our understanding of experience
[Quine]
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9018
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A physical object is the four-dimensional material content of a portion of space-time
[Quine]
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1628
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If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience
[Quine]
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8464
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Physical objects in space-time are just events or processes, no matter how disconnected
[Quine]
|
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7924
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The notion of a physical object is by far the most useful one for science
[Quine]
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2351
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Aristotle says an object (e.g. a lamp) has identity if its parts stay together when it is moved
[Putnam]
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10541
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Concrete objects such as sounds and smells may not be possible objects of ostension
[Dummett]
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17556
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Material objects are in space and time, move, have a surface and mass, and are made of some stuff
[Inwagen]
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8264
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Maybe table-shaped particles exist, but not tables
[Inwagen, by Lowe]
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8515
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Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes
[Campbell,K]
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8519
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Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't!
[Campbell,K]
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11116
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Being a physical object is our most fundamental category
[Jubien]
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7685
|
An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties
[Jacquette]
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7008
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Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes
[Heil]
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7018
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Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties
[Heil]
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10272
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The notion of 'object' is at least partially structural and mathematical
[Shapiro]
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8267
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Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality
[Lowe]
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8265
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Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value
[Lowe]
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8275
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Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects
[Lowe]
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16130
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To be an object at all requires identity-conditions
[Lowe]
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16232
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An object is 'natural' if its stages are linked by certain non-supervenient relations
[Hawley]
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6124
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I say that most of the objects of folk ontology do not exist
[Merricks]
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6134
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Is swimming pool water an object, composed of its mass or parts?
[Merricks]
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10782
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The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic
[Linnebo]
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14952
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Things are constructs for tracking patterns (and not linguistic, because animals do it)
[Ladyman/Ross]
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14485
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Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable
[Thomasson]
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14487
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The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met
[Thomasson]
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23772
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If objects are property bundles, the properties need combining powers
[Williams,NE]
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22627
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Compound objects are processes, insofar as change is essential to them
[Ingthorsson]
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