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Single Idea 16233

[filed under theme 9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time ]

Full Idea

A problem for Gallois is that he leaves us no way to talk about questions of genuine identity through time, and thus undercuts one motivation for his own position.

Gist of Idea

Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible

Source

comment on André Gallois (Occasions of Identity [1998]) by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 5.8

Book Ref

Hawley,Katherine: 'How Things Persist' [OUP 2004], p.163

A Reaction

Gallois seems to need a second theory of identity to support his Occasional Identity theory. Two things need an identity each, before we can say that the two identities coincide. (Time to read Gallois!)

Related Idea

Idea 16231 Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others [Gallois, by Hawley]

The 16 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about sameness of objects over time]:

1504 Something must be unchanging to make recognition and knowledge possible [Aristotle on Parmenides]
12503 Identity means that the idea of a thing remains the same over time [Locke]
13182 Changeable accidents are modifications of unchanging essences [Leibniz]
21300 A change more obviously destroys an identity if it is quick and observed [Hume]
21299 Changing a part can change the whole, not absolutely, but by its proportion of the whole [Hume]
1350 Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist [Reid]
5626 An a priori principle of persistence anticipates all experience [Kant]
16991 No one seems to know the identity conditions for a material object (or for people) over time [Kripke]
16503 'What is it?' gives the kind, nature, persistence conditions and identity over time of a thing [Wiggins]
9663 A thing 'perdures' if it has separate temporal parts, and 'endures' if it is wholly present at different times [Lewis]
16025 If things change they become different - but then no one thing undergoes the change! [Gallois]
16233 Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible [Hawley on Gallois]
14958 A continuous object might be a type, with instances at each time [Ladyman/Ross]
15396 Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one [Cameron]
22612 Endurance and perdurance just show the consequences of A or B series time [Ingthorsson]
22625 Science suggests causal aspects of the constitution and persistance of objects [Ingthorsson]