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Single Idea 1624

[filed under theme 19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique ]

Full Idea

In defining analyticity an appeal to meanings seems natural, but that reduces to synonymy or definition. Definition is a will-o'-the-wisp, and synonymy is best understood by a priori appeal to analyticity, so we are back at the problem of analyticity.

Gist of Idea

If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity

Source

Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953], p.32)

Book Ref

Quine,Willard: 'From a Logical Point of View' [Harper and Row 1963], p.32


A Reaction

Quine is full of these over-neat sceptical arguments, saying everything is circular, or can never get started. Compare Aristotle's benign circle of virtuous people and virtuous actions.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [rejection of sharp distinction between real and verbal assertion]:

Concepts are only analytic once the predicate is absorbed into the subject [Schleiermacher]
When we explicate the category of being, we watch a new category emerge [Hegel, by Houlgate]
Frege fails to give a concept of analyticity, so he fails to explain synthetic a priori truth that way [Katz on Frege]
Holism in language blurs empirical synthetic and empty analytic sentences [Quine]
In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity [Quine]
I will even consider changing a meaning to save a law; I question the meaning-fact cleavage [Quine]
Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian]
Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson]
The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine]
Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine]
The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins]
Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine]
If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine]
The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction [Quine]
If we claim direct insight to what is analytic, how do we know it is not sub-consciously empirical? [Rey]
The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K]
Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider]