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Single Idea 16243
[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
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Full Idea
The Humean project is unjustified, in that both the laws of nature and the direction of time require no analysis, and is misconceived, in that the atoms it employs do not correspond to present physical ontology.
Gist of Idea
The Humean view is wrong; laws and direction of time are primitive, and atoms are decided by physics
Source
Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], Intro)
Book Ref
Maudlin,Tim: 'The Metaphysics within Physics' [OUP 2007], p.3
A Reaction
I certainly find it strange, or excessively empirical, that Lewis thinks our account of reality should rest on 'qualities'. Maudlin's whole books is an implicit attack on David Lewis.
The
31 ideas
from 'The Metaphysics within Physics'
16241
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The metaphysics of nature should focus on physics
[Maudlin]
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16244
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If the universe is profligate, the Razor leads us astray
[Maudlin]
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16243
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The Humean view is wrong; laws and direction of time are primitive, and atoms are decided by physics
[Maudlin]
|
16242
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Laws of nature are ontological bedrock, and beyond analysis
[Maudlin]
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16245
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Laws should help explain the things they govern, or that manifest them
[Maudlin]
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16247
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Laws are primitive, so two indiscernible worlds could have the same laws
[Maudlin]
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16248
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Evaluating counterfactuals involves context and interests
[Maudlin]
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16250
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We don't pick a similar world from many - we construct one possibility from the description
[Maudlin]
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16249
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A counterfactual antecedent commands the redescription of a selected moment
[Maudlin]
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16251
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'Humans with prime house numbers are mortal' is not a law, because not a natural kind
[Maudlin]
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16254
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Induction leaps into the unknown, but usually lands safely
[Maudlin]
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16253
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A property is fundamental if two objects can differ in only that respect
[Maudlin]
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16255
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The Razor rightly prefers one cause of multiple events to coincidences of causes
[Maudlin]
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16257
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Kant survives in seeing metaphysics as analysing our conceptual system, which is a priori
[Maudlin]
|
16258
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To get an ontology from ontological commitment, just add that some theory is actually true
[Maudlin]
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16259
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Naïve translation from natural to formal language can hide or multiply the ontology
[Maudlin]
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16260
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Existence of universals may just be decided by acceptance, or not, of second-order logic
[Maudlin]
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16263
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Fundamental physics seems to suggest there are no such things as properties
[Maudlin]
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16264
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I believe the passing of time is a fundamental fact about the world
[Maudlin]
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16265
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If time passes, presumably it passes at one second per second
[Maudlin]
|
16266
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There is one ordered B series, but an infinitude of A series, depending on when the present is
[Maudlin]
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16268
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The counterfactual is ruined if some other cause steps in when the antecedent fails
[Maudlin]
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16267
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If we know the cause of an event, we seem to assent to the counterfactual
[Maudlin]
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16269
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If the effect hadn't occurred the cause wouldn't have happened, so counterfactuals are two-way
[Maudlin]
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16270
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If laws are just regularities, then there have to be laws
[Maudlin]
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16272
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Fundamental laws say how nature will, or might, evolve from some initial state
[Maudlin]
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16271
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Lewis says it supervenes on the Mosaic, but actually thinks the Mosaic is all there is
[Maudlin]
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16273
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If the Humean Mosaic is ontological bedrock, there can be no explanation of its structure
[Maudlin]
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16275
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The 'spinning disc' is just impossible, because there cannot be 'homogeneous matter'
[Maudlin]
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16276
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Wide metaphysical possibility may reduce metaphysics to analysis of fantasies
[Maudlin]
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16277
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Logically impossible is metaphysically impossible, but logically possible is not metaphysically possible
[Maudlin]
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