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Single Idea 16250
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
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Full Idea
It seems unlikely the psychological process could mirror Lewis's semantics: people don't imagine a multiplicity of worlds and the pick out the most similar. Rather we construct representations of possible worlds from counterfactual descriptions.
Gist of Idea
We don't pick a similar world from many - we construct one possibility from the description
Source
Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 1.5)
Book Ref
Maudlin,Tim: 'The Metaphysics within Physics' [OUP 2007], p.33
A Reaction
I approve of fitting such theories into a psychology, but this may be unfair to Lewis, who aims for a logical model, not an account of how we actually approach the problem.
The
31 ideas
from 'The Metaphysics within Physics'
16241
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The metaphysics of nature should focus on physics
[Maudlin]
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16244
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If the universe is profligate, the Razor leads us astray
[Maudlin]
|
16243
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The Humean view is wrong; laws and direction of time are primitive, and atoms are decided by physics
[Maudlin]
|
16242
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Laws of nature are ontological bedrock, and beyond analysis
[Maudlin]
|
16245
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Laws should help explain the things they govern, or that manifest them
[Maudlin]
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16247
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Laws are primitive, so two indiscernible worlds could have the same laws
[Maudlin]
|
16249
|
A counterfactual antecedent commands the redescription of a selected moment
[Maudlin]
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16248
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Evaluating counterfactuals involves context and interests
[Maudlin]
|
16250
|
We don't pick a similar world from many - we construct one possibility from the description
[Maudlin]
|
16251
|
'Humans with prime house numbers are mortal' is not a law, because not a natural kind
[Maudlin]
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16254
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Induction leaps into the unknown, but usually lands safely
[Maudlin]
|
16253
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A property is fundamental if two objects can differ in only that respect
[Maudlin]
|
16255
|
The Razor rightly prefers one cause of multiple events to coincidences of causes
[Maudlin]
|
16257
|
Kant survives in seeing metaphysics as analysing our conceptual system, which is a priori
[Maudlin]
|
16258
|
To get an ontology from ontological commitment, just add that some theory is actually true
[Maudlin]
|
16259
|
Naïve translation from natural to formal language can hide or multiply the ontology
[Maudlin]
|
16260
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Existence of universals may just be decided by acceptance, or not, of second-order logic
[Maudlin]
|
16263
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Fundamental physics seems to suggest there are no such things as properties
[Maudlin]
|
16264
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I believe the passing of time is a fundamental fact about the world
[Maudlin]
|
16265
|
If time passes, presumably it passes at one second per second
[Maudlin]
|
16266
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There is one ordered B series, but an infinitude of A series, depending on when the present is
[Maudlin]
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16268
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The counterfactual is ruined if some other cause steps in when the antecedent fails
[Maudlin]
|
16267
|
If we know the cause of an event, we seem to assent to the counterfactual
[Maudlin]
|
16269
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If the effect hadn't occurred the cause wouldn't have happened, so counterfactuals are two-way
[Maudlin]
|
16270
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If laws are just regularities, then there have to be laws
[Maudlin]
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16272
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Fundamental laws say how nature will, or might, evolve from some initial state
[Maudlin]
|
16271
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Lewis says it supervenes on the Mosaic, but actually thinks the Mosaic is all there is
[Maudlin]
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16273
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If the Humean Mosaic is ontological bedrock, there can be no explanation of its structure
[Maudlin]
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16275
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The 'spinning disc' is just impossible, because there cannot be 'homogeneous matter'
[Maudlin]
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16276
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Wide metaphysical possibility may reduce metaphysics to analysis of fantasies
[Maudlin]
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16277
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Logically impossible is metaphysically impossible, but logically possible is not metaphysically possible
[Maudlin]
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