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Single Idea 16256

[filed under theme 10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary ]

Full Idea

Kant maintained that metaphysics must be a body of necessary truths, and that necessary truths must be a priori, so metaphysical claims could not be justified by experience.

Gist of Idea

For Kant metaphysics must be necessary, so a priori, so can't be justified by experience

Source

report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Tim Maudlin - The Metaphysics within Physics 3

Book Ref

Maudlin,Tim: 'The Metaphysics within Physics' [OUP 2007], p.78


A Reaction

I'm coming to the view that there is no a priori necessity, and that all necessities are entailments from the nature of reality. The apparent a priori necessities are just at a very high level of abstraction.

Related Idea

Idea 16257 Kant survives in seeing metaphysics as analysing our conceptual system, which is a priori [Maudlin]


The 22 ideas with the same theme [knowing what must be, just through thought]:

We know by thought that what is done cannot be undone [Descartes]
Some of our ideas contain relations which we cannot conceive to be absent [Locke]
Truths of reason are known by analysis, and are necessary; facts are contingent, and their opposites possible [Leibniz]
Proofs of necessity come from the understanding, where they have their source [Leibniz]
Intelligible truth is independent of any external things or experiences [Leibniz]
Kant thought worldly necessities are revealed by what maths needs to make sense [Kant, by Morris,M]
Necessity is always knowable a priori, and what is known a priori is always necessary [Kant, by Schroeter]
For Kant metaphysics must be necessary, so a priori, so can't be justified by experience [Kant, by Maudlin]
Maths must be a priori because it is necessary, and that cannot be derived from experience [Kant]
The tautologies of logic show the logic of language and the world [Wittgenstein]
A statement can be metaphysically necessary and epistemologically contingent [Putnam]
Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker]
Kripke separates necessary and a priori, proposing necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori examples [Kripke, by O'Grady]
A priori = Necessary because we imagine all worlds, and we know without looking at actuality? [Kripke]
Necessity and contingency are separate from the a priori and the a posteriori [Harré/Madden]
Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity [Dennett]
Many necessities are inexpressible, and unknowable a priori [Kitcher]
If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo]
Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity [Chalmers]
Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson]
We can't infer metaphysical necessities to be a priori knowable - or indeed knowable in any way [Williamson]
Maybe developments in logic and geometry have shown that the a priori may be relative [O'Grady]