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Single Idea 16256
[filed under theme 10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
]
Full Idea
Kant maintained that metaphysics must be a body of necessary truths, and that necessary truths must be a priori, so metaphysical claims could not be justified by experience.
Gist of Idea
For Kant metaphysics must be necessary, so a priori, so can't be justified by experience
Source
report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Tim Maudlin - The Metaphysics within Physics 3
Book Ref
Maudlin,Tim: 'The Metaphysics within Physics' [OUP 2007], p.78
A Reaction
I'm coming to the view that there is no a priori necessity, and that all necessities are entailments from the nature of reality. The apparent a priori necessities are just at a very high level of abstraction.
Related Idea
Idea 16257
Kant survives in seeing metaphysics as analysing our conceptual system, which is a priori [Maudlin]
The
22 ideas
with the same theme
[knowing what must be, just through thought]:
2301
|
We know by thought that what is done cannot be undone
[Descartes]
|
12553
|
Some of our ideas contain relations which we cannot conceive to be absent
[Locke]
|
2112
|
Truths of reason are known by analysis, and are necessary; facts are contingent, and their opposites possible
[Leibniz]
|
17079
|
Proofs of necessity come from the understanding, where they have their source
[Leibniz]
|
19432
|
Intelligible truth is independent of any external things or experiences
[Leibniz]
|
23461
|
Kant thought worldly necessities are revealed by what maths needs to make sense
[Kant, by Morris,M]
|
14710
|
Necessity is always knowable a priori, and what is known a priori is always necessary
[Kant, by Schroeter]
|
16256
|
For Kant metaphysics must be necessary, so a priori, so can't be justified by experience
[Kant, by Maudlin]
|
5524
|
Maths must be a priori because it is necessary, and that cannot be derived from experience
[Kant]
|
23495
|
The tautologies of logic show the logic of language and the world
[Wittgenstein]
|
9169
|
A statement can be metaphysically necessary and epistemologically contingent
[Putnam]
|
15101
|
Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity
[Shoemaker]
|
4728
|
Kripke separates necessary and a priori, proposing necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori examples
[Kripke, by O'Grady]
|
16990
|
A priori = Necessary because we imagine all worlds, and we know without looking at actuality?
[Kripke]
|
15228
|
Necessity and contingency are separate from the a priori and the a posteriori
[Harré/Madden]
|
2526
|
Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity
[Dennett]
|
12428
|
Many necessities are inexpressible, and unknowable a priori
[Kitcher]
|
20476
|
If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved
[Casullo]
|
13956
|
Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity
[Chalmers]
|
9598
|
Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking
[Williamson]
|
21621
|
We can't infer metaphysical necessities to be a priori knowable - or indeed knowable in any way
[Williamson]
|
4719
|
Maybe developments in logic and geometry have shown that the a priori may be relative
[O'Grady]
|