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Single Idea 16257

[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual ]

Full Idea

The Kantian strain survives in the notion that metaphysics is not about the world, but about our 'conceptual system', especially as what structures our thought about the world. This keeps it a priori, and so not about the world itself.

Gist of Idea

Kant survives in seeing metaphysics as analysing our conceptual system, which is a priori

Source

Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 3)

Book Ref

Maudlin,Tim: 'The Metaphysics within Physics' [OUP 2007], p.78

A Reaction

Strawson would embody this view, I suppose. I take our conceptual system to be largely a reflection of (and even creation of) the world, and not just an arbitrary conventional attempt to grasp the world. Analysing concepts partly analyses the world.

Related Idea

Idea 16256 For Kant metaphysics must be necessary, so a priori, so can't be justified by experience [Kant, by Maudlin]

The 24 ideas with the same theme [metaphysics as study of our conceptual schemes]:

21408 For any subject, its system of non-experiential concepts needs a metaphysics [Kant]
21768 Logic is metaphysics, the science of things grasped in thoughts [Hegel]
22077 Metaphysics is the lattice which makes incoming material intelligible [Hegel]
21761 If we start with indeterminate being, we arrive at being and nothing as a united pair [Hegel, by Houlgate]
21764 Thought about being leads to a string of other concepts, like becoming, quantity, specificity, causality... [Hegel, by Houlgate]
21769 We must start with absolute abstraction, with no presuppositions, so we start with pure being [Hegel]
12112 Metaphysics is just the oversubtle qualification of abstract names for phenomena [Comte]
19219 Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce]
13876 The syntactic category is primary, and the ontological category is derivative [Frege, by Wright,C]
20352 Nietzsche has a metaphysics, as well as perspectives - the ontology is the perspectives [Nietzsche, by Richardson]
11103 We aren't stuck with our native conceptual scheme; we can gradually change it [Quine]
6310 Enquiry needs a conceptual scheme, so we should retain the best available [Quine]
15801 Many philosophers aim to understand metaphysics by studying ourselves [Chisholm]
7922 Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories [Strawson,P]
6979 Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences [Jackson]
15215 Philosophy devises and assesses conceptual schemes in the service of worldviews [Harré/Madden]
4214 Maybe such concepts as causation, identity and existence are primitive and irreducible [Lowe]
13919 Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things [Lowe]
15003 It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe [Sider]
15169 Metaphysics is clarifying how we speak and think (and possibly improving it) [Sidelle]
9217 Modern empirical metaphysics focuses on ontological commitments of discourse, or on presuppositions [Loux/Zimmerman]
16257 Kant survives in seeing metaphysics as analysing our conceptual system, which is a priori [Maudlin]
14898 Modern metaphysics pursues aesthetic criteria like story-writing, and abandons scientific truth [Ladyman/Ross]
18835 Logic doesn't have a metaphysical basis, but nor can logic give rise to the metaphysics [Rumfitt]