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Single Idea 16266

[filed under theme 27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series ]

Full Idea

Given events ordered in a B series, one defines an infinitude of different A series that correspond to taking different events as 'now' or 'present'. McTaggart talks of 'the A series' when there is an infinitude of such.

Gist of Idea

There is one ordered B series, but an infinitude of A series, depending on when the present is

Source

Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 4.3 n11)

Book Ref

Maudlin,Tim: 'The Metaphysics within Physics' [OUP 2007], p.126

A Reaction

This strikes me as a rather mathematical (and distorted) claim about the A series view. The A-series is one dynamic happening. Not an infinity of static times lines, each focused on a different 'now'.

The 31 ideas from Tim Maudlin

16241 The metaphysics of nature should focus on physics [Maudlin]
16244 If the universe is profligate, the Razor leads us astray [Maudlin]
16243 The Humean view is wrong; laws and direction of time are primitive, and atoms are decided by physics [Maudlin]
16242 Laws of nature are ontological bedrock, and beyond analysis [Maudlin]
16245 Laws should help explain the things they govern, or that manifest them [Maudlin]
16247 Laws are primitive, so two indiscernible worlds could have the same laws [Maudlin]
16248 Evaluating counterfactuals involves context and interests [Maudlin]
16250 We don't pick a similar world from many - we construct one possibility from the description [Maudlin]
16249 A counterfactual antecedent commands the redescription of a selected moment [Maudlin]
16251 'Humans with prime house numbers are mortal' is not a law, because not a natural kind [Maudlin]
16254 Induction leaps into the unknown, but usually lands safely [Maudlin]
16253 A property is fundamental if two objects can differ in only that respect [Maudlin]
16255 The Razor rightly prefers one cause of multiple events to coincidences of causes [Maudlin]
16257 Kant survives in seeing metaphysics as analysing our conceptual system, which is a priori [Maudlin]
16258 To get an ontology from ontological commitment, just add that some theory is actually true [Maudlin]
16259 Naïve translation from natural to formal language can hide or multiply the ontology [Maudlin]
16260 Existence of universals may just be decided by acceptance, or not, of second-order logic [Maudlin]
16263 Fundamental physics seems to suggest there are no such things as properties [Maudlin]
16264 I believe the passing of time is a fundamental fact about the world [Maudlin]
16265 If time passes, presumably it passes at one second per second [Maudlin]
16266 There is one ordered B series, but an infinitude of A series, depending on when the present is [Maudlin]
16268 The counterfactual is ruined if some other cause steps in when the antecedent fails [Maudlin]
16267 If we know the cause of an event, we seem to assent to the counterfactual [Maudlin]
16269 If the effect hadn't occurred the cause wouldn't have happened, so counterfactuals are two-way [Maudlin]
16270 If laws are just regularities, then there have to be laws [Maudlin]
16272 Fundamental laws say how nature will, or might, evolve from some initial state [Maudlin]
16271 Lewis says it supervenes on the Mosaic, but actually thinks the Mosaic is all there is [Maudlin]
16273 If the Humean Mosaic is ontological bedrock, there can be no explanation of its structure [Maudlin]
16275 The 'spinning disc' is just impossible, because there cannot be 'homogeneous matter' [Maudlin]
16276 Wide metaphysical possibility may reduce metaphysics to analysis of fantasies [Maudlin]
16277 Logically impossible is metaphysically impossible, but logically possible is not metaphysically possible [Maudlin]