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Single Idea 16279

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification ]

Full Idea

Causal accounts of knowledge are all very well in their place, but if they are put forward as general theories, then mathematics refutes them.

Gist of Idea

General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics

Source

David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 2.4)

Book Ref

Lewis,David: 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [Blackwell 2001], p.109


A Reaction

You might have some sort of notion of an abstraction from causation which mimicked it in the mathematics case. Lots of things seem to be 'forced' in mathematics. Call it 'ersatz causation'. Necessities are enforcers.


The 14 ideas with the same theme [justification needs a causal link from facts to beliefs]:

Psychological logic can't distinguish justification from causes of a belief [Frege]
Causes of beliefs are irrelevant to their contents [Wittgenstein]
Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle]
Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa]
General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics [Lewis]
Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified) [Dennett]
How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die? [Dancy,J]
Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification [Dancy,J]
In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M]
How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M]
Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M]
My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton]
One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz]
Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed [Kusch]