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Full Idea
There are two difficulties with Carnap's taking possible worlds as linguistic. Everything must have a name, or our state-descriptions will be silent about nameless things, and nothing may have two names, or we may affirm and deny a predicate of one thing.
Gist of Idea
Linguistic possible worlds need a complete supply of unique names for each thing
Source
David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 3.2)
Book Ref
Lewis,David: 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [Blackwell 2001], p.145
A Reaction
The idea of possible worlds as linguistic has no appeal for me, so this problem doesn't surprise or bother me, but it sounds fairly terminal for the project.
| 11964 | Possible worlds are world-stories, maximal descriptions of whole non-existent worlds [Adams,RM, by Molnar] |
| 16285 | A possible world can be seen as a complete and consistent novel [Jeffrey] |
| 11850 | Not every story corresponds to a possible world [Wiggins] |
| 16286 | Linguistic possible worlds need a complete supply of unique names for each thing [Lewis] |
| 16287 | Maximal consistency for a world seems a modal distinction, concerning what could be true together [Lewis] |
| 9662 | Linguistic possible worlds have problems of inconsistencies, no indiscernibles, and vocabulary [Lewis] |
| 19493 | Governing possible worlds theory is the fiction that if something is possible, it happens in a world [Yablo] |
| 5751 | The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia] |