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Full Idea
An ersatz world must be maximally consistent (hence destroyed by an additional sentences), …but that is prima facie a modal distinction: a set of sentences is consistent iff those sentences, as interpreted, could all be true together.
Clarification
'prima facie' means at first glance
Gist of Idea
Maximal consistency for a world seems a modal distinction, concerning what could be true together
Source
David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 3.2)
Book Ref
Lewis,David: 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [Blackwell 2001], p.151
A Reaction
This is indicative of Lewis's motivation for his project, which is to eliminate modal facts from the world. Only a vast multitude of non-modal concrete worlds can satisfy all the contraints. Cf many-worlds quantum mechanics for non-locality.
| 11964 | Possible worlds are world-stories, maximal descriptions of whole non-existent worlds [Adams,RM, by Molnar] |
| 16285 | A possible world can be seen as a complete and consistent novel [Jeffrey] |
| 11850 | Not every story corresponds to a possible world [Wiggins] |
| 16286 | Linguistic possible worlds need a complete supply of unique names for each thing [Lewis] |
| 16287 | Maximal consistency for a world seems a modal distinction, concerning what could be true together [Lewis] |
| 9662 | Linguistic possible worlds have problems of inconsistencies, no indiscernibles, and vocabulary [Lewis] |
| 19493 | Governing possible worlds theory is the fiction that if something is possible, it happens in a world [Yablo] |
| 5751 | The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia] |