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Single Idea 16290

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets ]

Full Idea

I believe in properties. That is, I have my candidates for entities to play the role and deserve the name. My principal candidates are sets of possible individuals.

Gist of Idea

I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals

Source

David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 3.4)

Book Ref

Lewis,David: 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [Blackwell 2001], p.189

A Reaction

I am bewildered by any claim that a property is a 'set'. The property of being a teaspoon is just a large pile of teaspoons (one pile in each possible world)? This is the tyranny of first-order logic in philosophy. Are sets more real than properties?

Related Idea

Idea 16281 Honesty requires philosophical theories we can commit to with our ordinary commonsense [Lewis]

The 22 ideas with the same theme [properties are just classes of certain objects]:

21575 When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell]
9127 Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen]
15478 Properties are the respects in which objects resemble, which places them in classes [Martin,CB]
12672 Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis]
19173 Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson]
9783 While no two classes coincide in membership, there are distinct but coextensive attributes [Cartwright,R]
15399 The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F [Lewis, by Cameron]
15732 Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set [Lewis]
15733 Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances [Lewis]
15734 If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too [Lewis]
9655 Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds [Lewis]
9653 It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances [Lewis]
10723 A property is the set of its actual and possible instances [Lewis, by Oliver]
16290 I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals [Lewis]
15516 A property is any class of possibilia [Lewis]
4038 Properties are sets of their possible instances (which separates 'renate' from 'cordate') [Lewis, by Mellor/Oliver]
14499 Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki]
7703 If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either [Jacquette]
18511 Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have [Heil]
10591 Logicians use 'property' and 'set' interchangeably, with little hanging on it [Shapiro]
21729 Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B]
10413 The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer]