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Single Idea 16293
[filed under theme 3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
]
Full Idea
A common complaint against traditional definitional theories of truth is that it is far from clear that the definiens is not more in need of clarification than the definiendum (that is, the notion of truth).
Clarification
The 'definiendum' is what is to be defined
Gist of Idea
Traditional definitions of truth often make it more obscure, rather than less
Source
Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 1)
Book Ref
Halbach,Volker: 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth' [CUP 2011], p.3
A Reaction
He refers to concepts like 'correspondence', 'facts', 'coherence' or 'utility', which are said to be trickier to understand than 'true'. I suspect that philosophers like Halbach confuse 'clear' with 'precise'. Coherence is quite clear, but imprecise.
The
29 ideas
with the same theme
[question of whether truth can be defined, and how]:
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8821
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Jesus said he bore witness to the truth. Pilate asked, What is truth?
[John]
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4736
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Truth is such a transcendentally clear notion that it cannot be further defined
[Descartes]
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19070
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Superficial truth is knowing how something is, which is consciousness of bare correctness
[Hegel]
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21793
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Genuine truth is the resolution of the highest contradiction
[Hegel]
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22092
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Kierkegaard's truth draws on authenticity, fidelity and honesty
[Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
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19466
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The word 'true' seems to be unique and indefinable
[Frege]
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6710
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You can only define a statement that something is 'true' by referring to its functional possibilities
[James]
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19178
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Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one
[Tarski]
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19177
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A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct
[Tarski]
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19186
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A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language
[Tarski]
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19194
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We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms
[Tarski]
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16295
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Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory
[Tarski, by Halbach]
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15342
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Tarski proved that any reasonably expressive language suffers from the liar paradox
[Tarski, by Horsten]
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19069
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'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless
[Tarski]
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10153
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In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical
[Tarski]
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18731
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There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept
[Wittgenstein]
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10840
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We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game
[Dummett]
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23295
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Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler
[Davidson]
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19160
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A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication
[Davidson]
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18542
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Defining truth presupposes that there can be a true definition
[Scruton]
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18365
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If truths are just identical with facts, then truths will make themselves true
[David]
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22301
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The Identity Theory says a proposition is true if it coincides with what makes it true
[Potter]
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18486
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We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation
[MacBride]
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15374
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Truth has no 'nature', but we should try to describe its behaviour in inferences
[Horsten]
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16293
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Traditional definitions of truth often make it more obscure, rather than less
[Halbach]
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16324
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Any definition of truth requires a metalanguage
[Halbach]
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16301
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If people have big doubts about truth, a definition might give it more credibility
[Halbach]
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15647
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Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language
[Halbach]
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19125
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If we define truth, we can eliminate it
[Halbach/Leigh]
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