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Single Idea 16323
[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
]
Full Idea
Tarski's distinction between object and metalanguage forms the basis of model theory.
Gist of Idea
The object language/ metalanguage distinction is the basis of model theory
Source
report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth 11
Book Ref
Halbach,Volker: 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth' [CUP 2011], p.146
The
36 ideas
from 'The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages'
15322
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Tarski's had the first axiomatic theory of truth that was minimally adequate
[Tarski, by Horsten]
|
16296
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Tarski's Theorem renders any precise version of correspondence impossible
[Tarski, by Halbach]
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19134
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Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages
[Davidson on Tarski]
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16303
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Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined
[Tarski, by Halbach]
|
16304
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Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction
[Halbach on Tarski]
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15339
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Tarski gave up on the essence of truth, and asked how truth is used, or how it functions
[Tarski, by Horsten]
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16302
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Tarski did not just aim at a definition; he also offered an adequacy criterion for any truth definition
[Tarski, by Halbach]
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19135
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Tarski enumerates cases of truth, so it can't be applied to new words or languages
[Davidson on Tarski]
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19138
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Tarski define truths by giving the extension of the predicate, rather than the meaning
[Davidson on Tarski]
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4699
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Tarski made truth relative, by only defining truth within some given artificial language
[Tarski, by O'Grady]
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19324
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Tarski has to avoid stating how truths relate to states of affairs
[Kirkham on Tarski]
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10672
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Tarskian semantics says that a sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence
[Tarski, by Hossack]
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16306
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Tarski defined truth, but an axiomatisation can be extracted from his inductive clauses
[Tarski, by Halbach]
|
15410
|
Truth only applies to closed formulas, but we need satisfaction of open formulas to define it
[Burgess on Tarski]
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18811
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Tarski uses sentential functions; truly assigning the objects to variables is what satisfies them
[Tarski, by Rumfitt]
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15365
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We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects
[Tarski, by Horsten]
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19314
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For physicalism, reduce truth to satisfaction, then define satisfaction as physical-plus-logic
[Tarski, by Kirkham]
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19316
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Insight: don't use truth, use a property which can be compositional in complex quantified sentence
[Tarski, by Kirkham]
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19175
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Tarski gave axioms for satisfaction, then derived its explicit definition, which led to defining truth
[Tarski, by Davidson]
|
10969
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Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth
[Tarski, by Read]
|
17746
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Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics
[Tarski, by Walicki]
|
10904
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Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences
[Mulligan/Simons/Smith on Tarski]
|
2571
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Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics
[Tarski, by Haack]
|
10821
|
Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it
[Tarski, by Field,H]
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10822
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A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory
[Field,H on Tarski]
|
18759
|
Identity is invariant under arbitrary permutations, so it seems to be a logical term
[Tarski, by McGee]
|
16323
|
The object language/ metalanguage distinction is the basis of model theory
[Tarski, by Halbach]
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18756
|
Tarski built a compositional semantics for predicate logic, from dependent satisfactions
[Tarski, by McGee]
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19313
|
Tarksi invented the first semantics for predicate logic, using this conception of truth
[Tarski, by Kirkham]
|
8940
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Tarski avoids the Liar Paradox, because truth cannot be asserted within the object language
[Tarski, by Fisher]
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10154
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Tarski's theory of truth shifted the approach away from syntax, to set theory and semantics
[Feferman/Feferman on Tarski]
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20407
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Taste is the capacity to judge an object or representation which is thought to be beautiful
[Tarski, by Schellekens]
|
16295
|
Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory
[Tarski, by Halbach]
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15342
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Tarski proved that any reasonably expressive language suffers from the liar paradox
[Tarski, by Horsten]
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19069
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'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless
[Tarski]
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10823
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A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function
[Tarski]
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