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Single Idea 16324
[filed under theme 3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
]
Full Idea
It is plain that the distinction between object and metalanguage is required for the definability of truth.
Gist of Idea
Any definition of truth requires a metalanguage
Source
Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 11)
Book Ref
Halbach,Volker: 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth' [CUP 2011], p.148
A Reaction
Halbach's axiomatic approach has given up on definability, and therefore it can seek to abandon the metalanguage and examine 'type-free' theories.
Related Idea
Idea 16295
Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory [Tarski, by Halbach]
The
29 ideas
with the same theme
[question of whether truth can be defined, and how]:
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8821
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Jesus said he bore witness to the truth. Pilate asked, What is truth?
[John]
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4736
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Truth is such a transcendentally clear notion that it cannot be further defined
[Descartes]
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19070
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Superficial truth is knowing how something is, which is consciousness of bare correctness
[Hegel]
|
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21793
|
Genuine truth is the resolution of the highest contradiction
[Hegel]
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22092
|
Kierkegaard's truth draws on authenticity, fidelity and honesty
[Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
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19466
|
The word 'true' seems to be unique and indefinable
[Frege]
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6710
|
You can only define a statement that something is 'true' by referring to its functional possibilities
[James]
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19178
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Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one
[Tarski]
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19177
|
A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct
[Tarski]
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19186
|
A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language
[Tarski]
|
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19194
|
We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms
[Tarski]
|
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16295
|
Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory
[Tarski, by Halbach]
|
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15342
|
Tarski proved that any reasonably expressive language suffers from the liar paradox
[Tarski, by Horsten]
|
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19069
|
'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless
[Tarski]
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10153
|
In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical
[Tarski]
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18731
|
There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept
[Wittgenstein]
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10840
|
We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game
[Dummett]
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23295
|
Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler
[Davidson]
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19160
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A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication
[Davidson]
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18542
|
Defining truth presupposes that there can be a true definition
[Scruton]
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18365
|
If truths are just identical with facts, then truths will make themselves true
[David]
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22301
|
The Identity Theory says a proposition is true if it coincides with what makes it true
[Potter]
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18486
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We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation
[MacBride]
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15374
|
Truth has no 'nature', but we should try to describe its behaviour in inferences
[Horsten]
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16293
|
Traditional definitions of truth often make it more obscure, rather than less
[Halbach]
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16324
|
Any definition of truth requires a metalanguage
[Halbach]
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16301
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If people have big doubts about truth, a definition might give it more credibility
[Halbach]
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15647
|
Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language
[Halbach]
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19125
|
If we define truth, we can eliminate it
[Halbach/Leigh]
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