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Single Idea 16332

[filed under theme 3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms ]

Full Idea

KF is useful for explicating Peano arithmetic, but it certainly does not come to close to being a theory that contains its own truth predicate.

Gist of Idea

The KF theory is useful, but it is not a theory containing its own truth predicate

Source

Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 16)

Book Ref

Halbach,Volker: 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth' [CUP 2011], p.229


A Reaction

Since it is a type-free theory, its main philosophical aspiration was to contain its own truth predicate, so that is bad news (for philosophers).


The 6 ideas with the same theme [Kripke-Feferman axiomatisation of truth]:

Kripke classified fixed points, and illuminated their use for clarifications [Kripke, by Halbach]
Kripke-Feferman has truth gaps, instead of classical logic, and aims for maximum strength [Horsten]
Kripke-Feferman theory KF axiomatises Kripke fixed-points, with Strong Kleene logic with gluts [Halbach]
The KF is much stronger deductively than FS, which relies on classical truth [Halbach]
The KF theory is useful, but it is not a theory containing its own truth predicate [Halbach]
KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh]