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Single Idea 16346

[filed under theme 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity ]

Full Idea

Should necessity be treated as a predicate rather than (as in modal logic) as a sentential operator? It is odd to assign different status to necessity and truth, hampering their interaction. That all necessities are true can't be expressed by an operator.

Gist of Idea

Maybe necessity is a predicate, not the usual operator, to make it more like truth

Source

Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 24.2)

Book Ref

Halbach,Volker: 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth' [CUP 2011], p.340


A Reaction

[compressed] Halbach and Horsten consistently treat truth as a predicate, but maybe truth is an operator. Making necessity a predicate and not an operator would be a huge upheaval in the world of modal logic. Nice move!


The 24 ideas with the same theme [understanding the concept of necessity]:

Necessity makes alternatives impossible [Aristotle]
What is necessary cannot be otherwise [Aristotle]
Every necessary proposition is demonstrable to someone who understands [Leibniz]
Necessary truths are those provable from identities by pure logic in finite steps [Leibniz, by Hacking]
Necessity is what will be, despite any alternative suppositions whatever [Mill]
Necessity can only mean what must be, without conditions of any kind [Mill]
Nothing necessary can come into existence, since it already 'is' [Kierkegaard]
Necessity is thought to require an event, but is only an after-effect of the event [Nietzsche]
Something can be irrefutable; that doesn't make it true [Nietzsche]
'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, saying it is true for all values of its argument [Russell]
Modal terms are properties of propositional functions, not of propositions [Russell]
Equating necessity with informal provability is the S4 conception of necessity [Lewis,CI, by Read]
Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine]
Kripke says his necessary a posteriori examples are known a priori to be necessary [Kripke, by Mackie,P]
What reduces the field of the possible is a step towards necessity [Harré/Madden]
Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock]
Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale]
Equating necessity with truth in every possible world is the S5 conception of necessity [Read]
We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? [Melia]
A sentence is necessary if it is true in a set of worlds, and nonfalse in the other worlds [Hanna]
Maybe necessity is a predicate, not the usual operator, to make it more like truth [Halbach]
Scotus based modality on semantic consistency, instead of on what the future could allow [Walicki]
The modern revival of necessity and possibility treated them as special cases of quantification [Vetter]
It is necessary that p means that nothing has the potentiality for not-p [Vetter]