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Single Idea 16349
[filed under theme 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
]
Full Idea
Russell rejected Frege's sense/reference distinction, on the grounds that, if reference is mediated by sense, we lose the idea of direct acquaintance and succumb to Descriptivism.
Gist of Idea
Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible
Source
report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 1.1
Book Ref
Recanati,François: 'Mental Files' [OUP 2012], p.5
A Reaction
[15,000th IDEA in the DB!! 23/3/2013, Weymouth] Recanati claims Russell made a mistake, because you can retain the sense/reference distinction, and still keep direct acquaintance (by means of 'non-descriptive senses').
Related Ideas
Idea 16348
Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties [Recanati]
Idea 16359
Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses [Recanati]
The
17 ideas
with the same theme
[giving meaning in the manner laid out by Gottlob Frege]:
11126
|
'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent
[Frege, by Margolis/Laurence]
|
8164
|
Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning
[Frege, by Dummett]
|
9817
|
Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content
[Frege, by Dummett]
|
8171
|
Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone
[Frege, by Dummett]
|
4954
|
Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined
[Kripke on Frege]
|
7304
|
Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone
[Frege, by Miller,A]
|
7309
|
Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone
[Frege, by Miller,A]
|
7312
|
'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness
[Frege, by Miller,A]
|
16349
|
Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible
[Russell, by Recanati]
|
7313
|
'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent)
[Russell, by Miller,A]
|
9836
|
Fregean semantics assumes a domain articulated into individual objects
[Dummett]
|
7331
|
A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic
[Davidson, by Macey]
|
7327
|
Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning
[Davidson, by Miller,A]
|
2520
|
Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth
[Katz]
|
6077
|
Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects
[McGinn]
|
16382
|
Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files
[Recanati]
|
18413
|
Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are
[Cappelen/Dever]
|