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Single Idea 16349

[filed under theme 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics ]

Full Idea

Russell rejected Frege's sense/reference distinction, on the grounds that, if reference is mediated by sense, we lose the idea of direct acquaintance and succumb to Descriptivism.

Gist of Idea

Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible

Source

report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 1.1

Book Ref

Recanati,François: 'Mental Files' [OUP 2012], p.5

A Reaction

[15,000th IDEA in the DB!! 23/3/2013, Weymouth] Recanati claims Russell made a mistake, because you can retain the sense/reference distinction, and still keep direct acquaintance (by means of 'non-descriptive senses').

Related Ideas

Idea 16348 Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties [Recanati]

Idea 16359 Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses [Recanati]

The 17 ideas with the same theme [giving meaning in the manner laid out by Gottlob Frege]:

11126 'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent [Frege, by Margolis/Laurence]
8164 Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning [Frege, by Dummett]
9817 Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content [Frege, by Dummett]
8171 Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone [Frege, by Dummett]
4954 Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined [Kripke on Frege]
7304 Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone [Frege, by Miller,A]
7309 Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A]
7312 'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A]
16349 Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati]
7313 'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A]
9836 Fregean semantics assumes a domain articulated into individual objects [Dummett]
7331 A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic [Davidson, by Macey]
7327 Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A]
2520 Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz]
6077 Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects [McGinn]
16382 Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files [Recanati]
18413 Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever]