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Single Idea 16353
[filed under theme 19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
]
Full Idea
As Peirce insisted, singularity as such cannot be described, it can only be given through actual world relations.
Gist of Idea
Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations
Source
François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 2.2)
Book Ref
Recanati,François: 'Mental Files' [OUP 2012], p.21
A Reaction
[Peirce - Exact Logic, Papers 3, 1967, §419] This is the key idea for Recanati's case for basing our grasp of singular things on their relation to a mental file.
The
25 ideas
with the same theme
[reference is fixed by a description]:
15155
|
Expressions always give ways of thinking of referents, rather than the referents themselves
[Frege, by Soames]
|
5387
|
It is pure chance which descriptions in a person's mind make a name apply to an individual
[Russell]
|
10448
|
If an expression can refer to anything, it may still instrinsically refer, but relative to a context
[Bach on Strawson,P]
|
6268
|
The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions
[Putnam]
|
6389
|
To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically
[Davidson]
|
16988
|
Descriptive reference shows how to refer, how to identify two things, and how to challenge existence
[Kripke, by PG]
|
17029
|
It can't be necessary that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him
[Kripke]
|
17032
|
Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel'
[Kripke]
|
10435
|
A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F
[Donnellan, by Sainsbury]
|
10451
|
Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic
[Bach on Donnellan]
|
5813
|
A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed
[Donnellan]
|
9039
|
If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit
[Evans]
|
14209
|
Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications)
[Lewis]
|
10439
|
What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives?
[Bach]
|
10441
|
If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties
[Bach]
|
10442
|
We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description
[Bach]
|
10445
|
It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description
[Bach]
|
10457
|
Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential
[Bach]
|
10463
|
Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it
[Bach]
|
16348
|
Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties
[Recanati]
|
16384
|
Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential)
[Recanati]
|
16352
|
A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is
.'
[Recanati]
|
16353
|
Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations
[Recanati]
|
16355
|
Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals
[Recanati]
|
22245
|
A linguistic expression refers to what its associated mental file refers to
[Recanati]
|