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Single Idea 16360
[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
]
Full Idea
An identity statement 'A=B' is informative to the extent that the terms 'A' and 'B' are associated with distinct mental files.
Gist of Idea
Identity statements are informative if they link separate mental files
Source
François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 4.1)
Book Ref
Recanati,François: 'Mental Files' [OUP 2012], p.42
A Reaction
Hence the information in 'Scott is the author of 'Waverley'' is information about what is in your mind, not what is happening in Scotland. This is Recanati's solution to one of Frege's classic puzzles. 'Morning Star' and 'Evening Star' files. Nice.
Related Idea
Idea 16359
Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses [Recanati]
The
20 ideas
with the same theme
[two objects turning out to be one object]:
15847
|
Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part
[Plato]
|
15825
|
Carneades denied the transitivity of identity
[Carneades, by Chisholm]
|
9853
|
Identity between objects is not a consequence of identity, but part of what 'identity' means
[Frege, by Dummett]
|
18440
|
Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive
[Quine]
|
17038
|
If Hesperus and Phosophorus are the same, they can't possibly be different
[Kripke]
|
17036
|
Identity statements can be contingent if they rely on descriptions
[Kripke]
|
9905
|
Identity statements make sense only if there are possible individuating conditions
[Benacerraf]
|
16224
|
There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b
[Evans, by PG]
|
16521
|
A is necessarily A, so if B is A, then B is also necessarily A
[Wiggins]
|
14073
|
Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law
[Gibbard]
|
15969
|
Two things can never be identical, so there is no problem
[Lewis]
|
6047
|
All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true
[McGinn]
|
5494
|
'Lightning is electric discharge' and 'Phosphorus is Venus' are synthetic a posteriori identities
[Lycan]
|
15074
|
We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible
[Fine,K]
|
16027
|
If two things are equal, each side involves a necessity, so the equality is necessary
[Gallois]
|
16231
|
Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others
[Gallois, by Hawley]
|
14081
|
Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations
[Schaffer,J]
|
16360
|
Identity statements are informative if they link separate mental files
[Recanati]
|
14477
|
Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category
[Thomasson]
|
14476
|
Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified
[Thomasson]
|