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Single Idea 16366
[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
]
Full Idea
If a subject can be credited with the thought that a is F, then he must have the conceptual resources for entertaining the thought that a is G, for every property of being G of which he has conception. This condition I call the 'Generality Constraint'.
Gist of Idea
The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything
Source
Gareth Evans (The Varieties of Reference [1980], p.104), quoted by François Recanati - Mental Files 5.3
Book Ref
Recanati,François: 'Mental Files' [OUP 2012], p.65
A Reaction
Recanati endorses the Constraint in his account of mental files. Apparently if I can entertain the thought of a circle being round, I can also entertain the thought of it being square, so I am not too sure about this one.
The
23 ideas
from Gareth Evans
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9041
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The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation
[Evans]
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9038
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We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes
[Evans]
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5823
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The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it
[Evans]
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9039
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If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit
[Evans]
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9040
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Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs
[Evans]
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9043
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We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people
[Evans]
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5824
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How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation?
[Evans]
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9042
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A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public
[Evans]
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5825
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Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information
[Evans]
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7639
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The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally
[Evans]
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14895
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'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification
[Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
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11881
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Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty
[Evans, by Mackie,P]
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16129
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Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague
[Evans, by Lowe]
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16459
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Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries?
[Evans]
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16460
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Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right
[Evans, by Lewis]
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16457
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There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion
[Evans, by Lewis]
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14484
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If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity
[Evans, by Thomasson]
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16224
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There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b
[Evans, by PG]
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12580
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Experiences have no conceptual content
[Evans, by Greco]
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23794
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Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual
[Evans, by Schulte]
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12575
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Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them
[Evans, by Peacocke]
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7643
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We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour
[Evans]
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16366
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The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything
[Evans]
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