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Single Idea 16373
[filed under theme 18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
]
Full Idea
The reference of a file is the object to which the subject stands in the relevant epistemic relation. In the case of encylopedic entries there is an arbitrary number of distinct relations. The file grows new links in an opportunistic manner.
Gist of Idea
Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one
Source
François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 11.3)
Book Ref
Recanati,François: 'Mental Files' [OUP 2012], p.140
A Reaction
I'm not convinced by Recanati's claim that encylopedic files are a distinct type. My files seem to grow these opportunistic links right from their inception. All files seem to have that feature. A file could have four links at its moment of launching.
Related Idea
Idea 16369
There is a single file per object, memorised, reactivated, consolidated and expanded [Papineau, by Recanati]
The
36 ideas
from 'Mental Files'
18409
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Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features
[Recanati]
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16348
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Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties
[Recanati]
|
16371
|
Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names
[Recanati]
|
16372
|
Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense
[Recanati]
|
16373
|
Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one
[Recanati]
|
16374
|
There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link
[Recanati]
|
16375
|
Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object
[Recanati]
|
16377
|
Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content
[Recanati]
|
16378
|
An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person
[Recanati]
|
16381
|
The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers)
[Recanati]
|
16380
|
Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication
[Recanati]
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16382
|
Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files
[Recanati]
|
16384
|
Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential)
[Recanati]
|
16386
|
Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well)
[Recanati]
|
16387
|
Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction
[Recanati]
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16388
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We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that
[Recanati]
|
16389
|
If two people think 'I am tired', they think the same thing, and they think different things
[Recanati]
|
16393
|
In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference
[Recanati]
|
16351
|
In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication
[Recanati]
|
16350
|
Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects
[Recanati]
|
16352
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A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….'
[Recanati]
|
16353
|
Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations
[Recanati]
|
16354
|
Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things
[Recanati]
|
16355
|
Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals
[Recanati]
|
16356
|
There may be two types of reference in language and thought: descriptive and direct
[Recanati]
|
16357
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Mental files are the counterparts of singular terms
[Recanati]
|
16358
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The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains
[Recanati]
|
16359
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Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses
[Recanati]
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16360
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Identity statements are informative if they link separate mental files
[Recanati]
|
16361
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A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object
[Recanati]
|
16364
|
Indexical don't refer; only their tokens do
[Recanati]
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16363
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Indexicals (like mental files) determine their reference relationally, not by satisfaction
[Recanati]
|
16365
|
Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents)
[Recanati]
|
16367
|
There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files
[Recanati]
|
16368
|
Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic
[Recanati]
|
16370
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A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files
[Recanati]
|