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Single Idea 16374
[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
]
Full Idea
It is not too difficult to imagine a continuum of cases between straightforward instances of knowledge by acquaintance and straightforward instances of knowledge by description, with more or less tenuous informational links to the referent.
Gist of Idea
There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link
Source
François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 12.2)
Book Ref
Recanati,François: 'Mental Files' [OUP 2012], p.150
The
44 ideas
from François Recanati
18409
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Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features
[Recanati]
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16348
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Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties
[Recanati]
|
16371
|
Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names
[Recanati]
|
16372
|
Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense
[Recanati]
|
16373
|
Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one
[Recanati]
|
16374
|
There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link
[Recanati]
|
16375
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Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object
[Recanati]
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16377
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Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content
[Recanati]
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16378
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An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person
[Recanati]
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16381
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The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers)
[Recanati]
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16380
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Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication
[Recanati]
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16384
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Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential)
[Recanati]
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16382
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Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files
[Recanati]
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16386
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Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well)
[Recanati]
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16387
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Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction
[Recanati]
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16389
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If two people think 'I am tired', they think the same thing, and they think different things
[Recanati]
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16388
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We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that
[Recanati]
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16393
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In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference
[Recanati]
|
16350
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Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects
[Recanati]
|
16351
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In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication
[Recanati]
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16352
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A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….'
[Recanati]
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16353
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Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations
[Recanati]
|
16354
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Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things
[Recanati]
|
16355
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Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals
[Recanati]
|
16356
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There may be two types of reference in language and thought: descriptive and direct
[Recanati]
|
16357
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Mental files are the counterparts of singular terms
[Recanati]
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16358
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The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains
[Recanati]
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16359
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Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses
[Recanati]
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16361
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A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object
[Recanati]
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16360
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Identity statements are informative if they link separate mental files
[Recanati]
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16364
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Indexical don't refer; only their tokens do
[Recanati]
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16363
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Indexicals (like mental files) determine their reference relationally, not by satisfaction
[Recanati]
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16365
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Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents)
[Recanati]
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16367
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There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files
[Recanati]
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16368
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Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic
[Recanati]
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16370
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A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files
[Recanati]
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22242
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Mental files are concepts, which are either collections or (better) containers
[Recanati]
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22243
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The Frege case of believing a thing is both F and not-F is explained by separate mental files
[Recanati]
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22245
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A linguistic expression refers to what its associated mental file refers to
[Recanati]
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22246
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A train of reasoning must be treated as all happening simultaneously
[Recanati]
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22247
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Indexicality is not just a feature of language; examples show it also occurs in thought
[Recanati]
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22248
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How can we communicate indexical thoughts to people not in the right context?
[Recanati]
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22249
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The Naive view of communication is that hearers acquire exactly the thoughts of the speaker
[Recanati]
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22250
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There are speakers' thoughts and hearers' thoughts, but no further thought attached to the utterance
[Recanati]
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