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Single Idea 16385
[filed under theme 19. Language / B. Reference / 2. Denoting
]
Full Idea
In Russell's definition of 'denoting', a definite description denotes an entity if that entity fits the description uniquely.
Gist of Idea
A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely
Source
report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 17.2
Book Ref
Recanati,François: 'Mental Files' [OUP 2012], p.226
A Reaction
[Recanati cites Donnellan for this] Hence denoting is not the same thing as reference. A description can denote beautifully, but fail to refer. Donnellan says if denoting were reference, someone might refer without realising it.
The
46 ideas
from 'On Denoting'
18775
|
Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment
[Russell, by Linsky,B]
|
7533
|
The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals
[Russell, by Monk]
|
6063
|
Russell can't attribute existence to properties
[McGinn on Russell]
|
18777
|
If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle
[Linsky,B on Russell]
|
4567
|
Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words
[Russell, by Cooper,DE]
|
16385
|
A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely
[Russell, by Recanati]
|
5810
|
Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions
[Donnellan on Russell]
|
16987
|
By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense'
[Russell, by Kripke]
|
4570
|
Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions
[Cooper,DE on Russell]
|
16349
|
Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible
[Russell, by Recanati]
|
7313
|
'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent)
[Russell, by Miller,A]
|
7767
|
The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions
[Russell, by Lycan]
|
11006
|
Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions
[Read on Russell]
|
18943
|
Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false
[Sawyer on Russell]
|
18944
|
Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F)
[Sawyer on Russell]
|
7758
|
'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement
[Russell, by Lycan]
|
18941
|
Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions
[Russell, by Sawyer]
|
4945
|
Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise
[Russell, by Kripke]
|
18942
|
Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object
[Russell, by Sawyer]
|
7745
|
Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names?
[McCullogh on Russell]
|
15159
|
The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper
[Russell, by Soames]
|
10449
|
Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications
[Russell, by Bach]
|
2612
|
Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates
[Russell, by Ayer]
|
7757
|
"Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier
[Russell, by Lycan]
|
6411
|
Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims
[Grayling on Russell]
|
10433
|
Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring
[Russell, by Sainsbury]
|
1608
|
The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed
[Russell, by Quine]
|
7754
|
Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity
[Russell, by Lycan]
|
21529
|
Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic
[Russell, by Lackey]
|
11009
|
Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false
[Read on Russell]
|
6333
|
The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic
[Russell, by Horwich]
|
6412
|
Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique
[Grayling on Russell]
|
7743
|
Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names
[Russell, by McCullogh]
|
7310
|
Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names
[Russell, by Miller,A]
|
12006
|
Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems
[Russell, by Forbes,G]
|
4569
|
Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties
[Russell, by Cooper,DE]
|
21549
|
The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers
[Lackey on Russell]
|
12796
|
Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars
[Laycock on Russell]
|
7532
|
Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes
[Russell, by Monk]
|
11988
|
Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description
[Kaplan on Russell]
|
6061
|
Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier
[Russell, by McGinn]
|
5772
|
The idea of a variable is fundamental
[Russell]
|
5774
|
Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions
[Russell]
|
5775
|
In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different
[Russell]
|
5773
|
The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..'
[Russell]
|
21726
|
In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance
[Russell]
|