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Single Idea 16391
[filed under theme 18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
]
Full Idea
Perry's newer token-reflexive framework says indexical thoughts have token-reflexive content, that is, thoughts that are about themselves and ascribe properties to themselves. …They relate not to the subject, but to the occurrence of a thought.
Gist of Idea
Indexical thoughts are about themselves, and ascribe properties to themselves
Source
report of John Perry (Reference and Reflexivity [2001]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 18.1
Book Ref
Recanati,François: 'Mental Files' [OUP 2012], p.249
A Reaction
[There seem to be four indexical theories: this one, Recanati's, the earlier Kaplan-Perry one, and Lewis's] Is Perry thinking of second-level thoughts? 'I'm bored' has the content 'boredom' plus 'felt in here'? How does 'I'm bored' refer to 'I'm bored'?
Related Idea
Idea 16364
Indexical don't refer; only their tokens do [Recanati]
The
22 ideas
from John Perry
4885
|
Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties
[Perry]
|
4884
|
Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand
[Perry]
|
4887
|
We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur
[Perry]
|
4888
|
It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them
[Perry]
|
4889
|
Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change
[Perry]
|
4890
|
A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought
[Perry]
|
4891
|
If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism
[Perry]
|
4892
|
If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours
[Perry]
|
4899
|
Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology
[Perry]
|
4898
|
Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities
[Perry]
|
4896
|
The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension
[Perry]
|
4900
|
Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent
[Perry]
|
4901
|
Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world
[Perry]
|
4897
|
A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth
[Perry]
|
15203
|
Tense is essential for thought and action
[Perry, by Le Poidevin]
|
15204
|
Actual tensed sentences cannot be tenseless, because they can cite their own context
[Perry, by Le Poidevin]
|
12151
|
If we replace 'I' in sentences about me, they are different beliefs and explanations of behaviour
[Perry]
|
12149
|
Indexicals are a problem for beliefs being just subject-proposition relations
[Perry]
|
18412
|
Indexicals individuate certain belief states, helping in explanation and prediction
[Perry]
|
12150
|
Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition
[Perry]
|
16391
|
Indexical thoughts are about themselves, and ascribe properties to themselves
[Perry, by Recanati]
|
12155
|
Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance
[Perry]
|