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Single Idea 16394

[filed under theme 19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference ]

Full Idea

One might think that the direction of Kripke's arguments goes the other way - that conclusions about reference and proper names were derived in part from controversial metaphysical assumptions about possible worlds and essential properties.

Gist of Idea

Kripke derives accounts of reference and proper names from assumptions about worlds and essences

Source

comment on Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Reference and Necessity Intro

Book Ref

Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Ways a World Might Be' [OUP 2003], p.165


A Reaction

Nathan Salmon is famous for charging Kripke with trying to get a metaphysics from a semantics, but this remark of Stalnaker's seems much more accurate. Kripke certainly assumes realism, and robust identity.

Related Ideas

Idea 16395 Kripke separated semantics from metaphysics, rather than linking them, making the latter independent [Kripke, by Stalnaker]

Idea 16408 Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker]


The 11 ideas with the same theme [thought connecting directly with external things]:

We should separate how the reference of 'gold' is fixed from its conceptual content [Putnam]
Like names, natural kind terms have their meaning fixed by extension and reference [Putnam]
Kripke derives accounts of reference and proper names from assumptions about worlds and essences [Stalnaker on Kripke]
Kripke has a definitional account of kinds, but not of naming [Almog on Kripke]
Direct reference is by proper names, or indexicals, or referential uses of descriptions [Adams,RM]
Kripke and Putnam made false claims that direct reference implies essentialism [Salmon,N]
The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N]
First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects [Jubien]
Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe]
Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well) [Recanati]
In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference [Recanati]