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Single Idea 16395

[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics ]

Full Idea

Kripke's contribution was not to connect metaphysical and semantic issues, but to separate them: to provide a context in which questions about essences of things could be posed independently of assumptions about semantic rules of reference.

Gist of Idea

Kripke separated semantics from metaphysics, rather than linking them, making the latter independent

Source

report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Reference and Necessity Intro

Book Ref

Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Ways a World Might Be' [OUP 2003], p.167


A Reaction

In other words, Kripke set metaphysics free from the tyranny of Quine, and facilitated its modern rebirth. Bravo.

Related Idea

Idea 16394 Kripke derives accounts of reference and proper names from assumptions about worlds and essences [Stalnaker on Kripke]


The 18 ideas with the same theme [possibility of abstract wisdom through pure thought]:

Kant turned metaphysics into epistemology, ignoring Aristotle's 'being qua being' [Kant, by Macdonald,C]
Metaphysics might do better to match objects to our cognition (and not start with the objects) [Kant]
You just can't stop metaphysical speculation, in any mature mind [Kant]
The voyage of reason may go only as far as the coastline of experience reaches [Kant]
The love of certainty holds us back in metaphysics [Joubert]
Older metaphysics naively assumed that thought grasped things in themselves [Hegel]
Metaphysics divided the old unified Greek world into two [Nietzsche, by Critchley]
Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin]
Metaphysics cannot give knowledge of the universe as a whole [Russell]
No possible evidence could decide the reality of numbers, so it is a pseudo-question [Carnap]
Kripke separated semantics from metaphysics, rather than linking them, making the latter independent [Kripke, by Stalnaker]
Is it likely that a successful, coherent, explanatory ontological hypothesis is true? [Fraassen]
There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory [Forbes,G]
If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K]
Questions of explanation should not be confused with metaphyics [Heil]
Metaphysical enquiry can survive if its conclusions are tentative [Sider]
Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept [Sider]
There is no test for metaphysics, except devising alternative theories [Ladyman/Ross]