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Full Idea
'Descriptive' semantics gives a semantics for the language without saying how practice explains why the semantics is right; …'foundational' semantics concerns the facts that give expressions their semantic values.
Gist of Idea
'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts
Source
Robert C. Stalnaker (Reference and Necessity [1997], §1)
Book Ref
Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Ways a World Might Be' [OUP 2003], p.166
A Reaction
[compressed] Sounds parallel to the syntax/semantics distinction, or proof-theoretical and semantic validity. Or the sense/reference distinction! Or object language/metalanguage. Shall I go on?
| 16396 | Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker] |
| 16403 | 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker] |
| 16397 | If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker] |
| 16399 | Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker] |
| 16398 | Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker] |
| 16401 | To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker] |
| 16405 | To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker] |
| 16406 | If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker] |
| 16404 | In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker] |
| 16408 | Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker] |
| 16407 | Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker] |