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Full Idea
The causal theory of reference is criticised for vagueness. Causal connections are ubiquitous, and there are obviously many individuals that are causally implicated in the speaker's use of a name, but they aren't all plausible candidates for the referent.
Gist of Idea
In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent
Source
Robert C. Stalnaker (Reference and Necessity [1997], 4)
Book Ref
Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Ways a World Might Be' [OUP 2003], p.175
A Reaction
This seems to be a very good objection. Among all the causal links back to some baptised object, we have to pick out the referential link, which needs a criterion.
16396 | Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker] |
16403 | 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker] |
16397 | If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker] |
16399 | Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker] |
16398 | Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker] |
16401 | To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker] |
16405 | To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker] |
16406 | If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker] |
16404 | In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker] |
16407 | Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker] |
16408 | Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker] |