more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 16405

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential ]

Full Idea

If we ask 'what must you know to understand a name?', the naïve answer is that one must know who or what it names - nothing more. (But no one would give this answer about what is needed to understand a definite description).

Gist of Idea

To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient?

Source

Robert C. Stalnaker (Reference and Necessity [1997], 4)

Book Ref

Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Ways a World Might Be' [OUP 2003], p.176


A Reaction

Presumably this is naive because names can be full of meaning ('the Empress'), or description and reference together ('there's the man who robbed me') and so on. It's a nice starting point though. A number can serve as a name.


The 22 ideas with the same theme [names do no more than pick out an object]:

Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing [Plato]
Mill says names have denotation but not connotation [Mill, by Kripke]
Proper names are just labels for persons or objects, and the meaning is the object [Mill, by Lycan]
The meaning of a proper name is the designated object [Frege]
The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions. [Russell, by Grayling]
Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach]
The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames]
A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function [Tarski]
A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object [Wittgenstein]
Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida]
The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke]
Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism [Kripke, by Szabó]
A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent [Kripke]
A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke]
The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans]
To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker]
Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach]
Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators [Jubien]
If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A]
Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer [Hofweber]
Millians say a name just means its object [Sawyer]