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Full Idea
If we ask 'what must you know to understand a name?', the naïve answer is that one must know who or what it names - nothing more. (But no one would give this answer about what is needed to understand a definite description).
Gist of Idea
To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient?
Source
Robert C. Stalnaker (Reference and Necessity [1997], 4)
Book Ref
Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Ways a World Might Be' [OUP 2003], p.176
A Reaction
Presumably this is naive because names can be full of meaning ('the Empress'), or description and reference together ('there's the man who robbed me') and so on. It's a nice starting point though. A number can serve as a name.
16396 | Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker] |
16403 | 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker] |
16397 | If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker] |
16399 | Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker] |
16398 | Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker] |
16401 | To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker] |
16405 | To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker] |
16406 | If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker] |
16404 | In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker] |
16408 | Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker] |
16407 | Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker] |