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Full Idea
I defend a version of counterpart theory that is quite different from Lewis's version, as it is tied to actualism (all that exists is part of the actual world) rather than possibilism (possible things may exist without actually existing).
Gist of Idea
Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory
Source
Robert C. Stalnaker (Counterparts and Identity [1987], 1)
Book Ref
Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Ways a World Might Be' [OUP 2003], p.112
A Reaction
This could be the theory I am after. I am sympathetic to both actualism and to counterpart theory. Off to the woodshed….
| 18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
| 16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
| 16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
| 16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
| 16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |