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Single Idea 16421

[filed under theme 10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary ]

Full Idea

Critics say there are no irreducible a posteriori truths. They can be factored into a part that is necessary, but knowable a priori through conceptual analysis, and a part knowable only a posteriori, but contingent. 2-D semantics makes this precise.

Gist of Idea

Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part

Source

Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 1)

Book Ref

Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Ways a World Might Be' [OUP 2003], p.202


A Reaction

[Critics are Sidelle, Jackson and Chalmers] Interesting. If gold is necessarily atomic number 79, or it wouldn't be gold, that sounds like an analytic truth about gold. Discovering the 79 wasn't a discovery of a necessity. Stalnaker rejects this idea.


The 10 ideas with the same theme [knowing what has to be, by means of experience]:

Quine's indispensability argument said arguments for abstracta were a posteriori [Quine, by Yablo]
For Quine the only way to know a necessity is empirically [Quine, by Dancy,J]
Essentialists say natural laws are in a new category: necessary a posteriori [Ellis]
It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke]
Kripke has demonstrated that some necessary truths are only knowable a posteriori [Kripke, by Chalmers]
"'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorus'" is necessarily true, if it is true, but not known a priori [Kripke]
Theoretical identities are between rigid designators, and so are necessary a posteriori [Kripke]
How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false? [Jackson]
Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker]
The necessary a posteriori is statements either of identity or of essence [Sidelle]