more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
The necessity or contingency of a proposition has nothing to do with our concepts or the meanings of our words. The possibilities would have been the same even if we had never conceived of them.
Gist of Idea
The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts
Source
Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 1)
Book Ref
Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Ways a World Might Be' [OUP 2003], p.203
A Reaction
This sounds in need of qualification, since some of the propositions will be explicitly about words and concepts. Still, I like this idea.
| 24030 | 3+4=7 is necessary because we cannot conceive of seven without including three and four [Descartes] |
| 18796 | Formal experience conditions show what is possible, and general conditions what is necessary [Kant] |
| 22018 | Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 15216 | Is conceptual necessity just conventional, or does it mirror something about nature? [Harré/Madden] |
| 15235 | There is a conceptual necessity when properties become a standard part of a nominal essence [Harré/Madden] |
| 16422 | The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker] |
| 16423 | Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker] |
| 13810 | The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing [Forbes,G] |
| 12028 | De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is [Forbes,G] |
| 11169 | Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K] |
| 15087 | Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale] |
| 12436 | Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale] |
| 15033 | Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider] |