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Single Idea 16422

[filed under theme 10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts ]

Full Idea

The necessity or contingency of a proposition has nothing to do with our concepts or the meanings of our words. The possibilities would have been the same even if we had never conceived of them.

Gist of Idea

The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts

Source

Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 1)

Book Ref

Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Ways a World Might Be' [OUP 2003], p.203

A Reaction

This sounds in need of qualification, since some of the propositions will be explicitly about words and concepts. Still, I like this idea.

The 65 ideas from Robert C. Stalnaker

12762 Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker]
12761 An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker]
12763 Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker]
12764 For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker]
12765 Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker]
12766 Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker]
18052 An assertion aims to add to the content of a context [Stalnaker, by Magidor]
14718 An assertion is an attempt to rule out certain possibilities, narrowing things down for good planning [Stalnaker, by Schroeter]
16422 The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker]
16423 Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker]
16421 Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker]
16429 A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker]
16430 Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker]
16428 Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker]
16431 In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker]
16432 One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker]
18823 To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt]
16409 Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker]
16411 If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker]
16412 If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker]
16410 Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker]
16433 Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker]
16436 Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker]
16434 Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker]
16437 Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker]
16438 Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker]
16439 A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker]
16440 I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker]
16443 Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker]
16444 Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker]
16445 I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker]
16442 I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker]
16447 A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker]
16446 Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker]
16448 Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker]
16449 In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker]
16450 Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker]
16452 Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker]
16453 The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker]
16454 Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker]
16461 We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker]
16464 We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker]
16465 In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker]
16466 Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker]
16467 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker]
16468 Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker]
16471 I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker]
16474 How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker]
14616 A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker]
14617 Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist [Stalnaker]
15793 We can take 'ways things might have been' as irreducible elements in our ontology [Stalnaker, by Lycan]
16396 Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker]
16403 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker]
16397 If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker]
16399 Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker]
16398 Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker]
16401 To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker]
16406 If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker]
16404 In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker]
16405 To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker]
16407 Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker]
16408 Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker]
14285 A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs [Stalnaker]
14286 In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false [Stalnaker]
10994 Conditionals are true if minimal revision of the antecedent verifies the consequent [Stalnaker, by Read]