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Full Idea
The necessity or contingency of a proposition has nothing to do with our concepts or the meanings of our words. The possibilities would have been the same even if we had never conceived of them.
Gist of Idea
The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts
Source
Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 1)
Book Ref
Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Ways a World Might Be' [OUP 2003], p.203
A Reaction
This sounds in need of qualification, since some of the propositions will be explicitly about words and concepts. Still, I like this idea.
| 16422 | The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker] |
| 16423 | Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker] |
| 16421 | Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker] |
| 16429 | A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker] |
| 16428 | Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker] |
| 16430 | Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker] |
| 16431 | In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker] |
| 16432 | One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker] |