more on this theme | more from this thinker
Full Idea
Two-dimensionalism says the necessity of a statement is constituted by the fact that the secondary intensions is a necessary proposition, and their a posteriori character is constituted by the fact that the associated primary intension is contingent.
Gist of Idea
Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension
Source
Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 2)
Book Ref
Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Ways a World Might Be' [OUP 2003], p.205
A Reaction
This view is found in Sidelle 1989, and then formalised by Jackson and Chalmers. I like metaphysical necessity, but I have some sympathy with the approach. The question must always be 'where does this necessity derive from'?
16423 | Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker] |
16422 | The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker] |
16421 | Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker] |
16429 | A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker] |
16428 | Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker] |
16430 | Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker] |
16431 | In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker] |
16432 | One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker] |