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Single Idea 16433

[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism ]

Full Idea

My main focus is on how, on an actualist interpretation of possible worlds as ways a world might be, one is to account for the possibility that there be individuals other than those that actually exist.

Gist of Idea

Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones?

Source

Robert C. Stalnaker (Mere Possibilities [2012], Pref)

Book Ref

Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Mere Possibilities' [Princeton 2012], p.-6


A Reaction

The obvious thought would be that they are constructions from components of actual individuals, such as the chimaera, or fictional characters. We need some psychology here, which is not Stalnaker's style.


The 13 ideas with the same theme [proposal that only our actual world exists]:

The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce]
The best version of reductionist actualism around is Armstrong's combinatorial account [Armstrong, by Read]
Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
Plantinga says there is just this world, with possibilities expressed in propositions [Plantinga, by Armstrong]
Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker]
Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions [Wiggins]
The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever]
Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets [Lewis, by Stalnaker]
Ersatzers say we have one world, and abstract representations of how it might have been [Lewis]
What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan on Lewis]
Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan on Lewis]
Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions) [Read]
Serious Actualism says there are no facts at all about something which doesn't exist [Simchen]