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Single Idea 16435

[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects ]

Full Idea

Plantinga proposes surrogates for nonexistent things - individual essences that are themselves necessary existents and that correspond one-to-one with all the 'things' that might exist.

Gist of Idea

Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things

Source

report of Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 1

Book Ref

Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Mere Possibilities' [Princeton 2012], p.2


A Reaction

There are an awful lot of competing concepts of essence flying around these days. This one seems to require some abstract 'third realm' (or worse) in which these essences can exist, awaiting the arrival of thinkers. Not for me.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [status of 'objects' that can't actually exist]:

Some philosophers say that in some qualified way non-existent things 'are' [Aristotle]
Meinong said all objects of thought (even self-contradictions) have some sort of being [Meinong, by Lycan]
The objects of knowledge are far more numerous than objects which exist [Meinong]
Common sense agrees with Meinong (rather than Russell) that 'Pegasus is a flying horse' is true [Lackey on Russell]
I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting [Russell]
On Meinong's principles 'the existent round square' has to exist [Russell]
If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell]
Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist [Lycan on Quine]
Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
There is an object for every set of properties (some of which exist, and others don't) [Parsons,T, by Sawyer]
Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist [Stalnaker]
Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan]
A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen]
Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks]
Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni]
's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA]
We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA]