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Full Idea
It is the identification of properties with sets that rules out, for Lewis, an actualist account of possible worlds.
Gist of Idea
Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets
Source
report of David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 1.1
Book Ref
Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Mere Possibilities' [Princeton 2012], p.7
A Reaction
I suppose the sets which are the properties have to include all the possible red things as well as the actual one. This escapes the renate/cordate problem.
| 16376 | The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce] |
| 11003 | The best version of reductionist actualism around is Armstrong's combinatorial account [Armstrong, by Read] |
| 16472 | Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga] |
| 18383 | Plantinga says there is just this world, with possibilities expressed in propositions [Plantinga, by Armstrong] |
| 16433 | Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker] |
| 11869 | Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions [Wiggins] |
| 18415 | The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
| 16441 | Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets [Lewis, by Stalnaker] |
| 16282 | Ersatzers say we have one world, and abstract representations of how it might have been [Lewis] |
| 15791 | What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan on Lewis] |
| 15790 | Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan on Lewis] |
| 10996 | Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions) [Read] |
| 16188 | Serious Actualism says there are no facts at all about something which doesn't exist [Simchen] |